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ABSTRACT 
How do public-private partnerships (PPP) differ from traditional public procurement and what 
role should governments play in them? This paper views PPPs as collaborative projects with 
imperfect information between parties. Typical public procurement contracts tackle asymmetric 
information problems, yet limit feasibility of projects: some are not profitable enough to ensure 
private party participation. Partnership improves feasibility; this justifies PPPs as a form of 
public good provision, and demonstrates how they differ from procurement. Four UK and 
Russian cases of PPP projects are analysed within the above framework, focusing on types of 
contracts, contributions of both partners, and specific partnership elements. 
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1. Introduction 
Public-private partnerships (PPP) are a popular form of public good provision jointly by 
government (municipal) bodies and private entrepreneurs. Opinions on the societal role of PPP 
range from extremely positive (Lattemann et al., 2009) through moderately critical (Regan et al., 
2011) to explicitly negative (Coulson, 2005; Siemiatycki, 2011), see also a discussion of various 
views on the public value of partnerships in Reynaers and De Graaf (2014). A review of 
approaches to and experiences with PPP is in Hodge and Greve (2007). PPPs are usually seen as 
an alternative to outsourcing (contracting out), privatization or public provision of public goods 
(Joha and Janssen, 2010, Stiglitz, 2002). Yet, as emphasized by Stiglitz (2002), one question is 
what role government should play in the partnerships. Of equal importance is how to 
contractually combine the contributions from the government and the private party. In practice, 
various types of contracts are in use. For example, in PPPs that have been formed to construct 
and renovate public buildings in The Netherlands, private partners are paid upon delivery of 
services (CMS, 2010)1, based on their actual inputs. In Finland the E75 and E18 roads were built 
by PPPs on concession contracts with a fixed and irrevocable proportion of gross payment for 
services coming after the roads are put in use (CEDR, 2009)2. Therefore the question in this 
paper is twofold: how should public and private contributions be optimally combined in one 
collaborative contract enabling such a partnership, and what does the “partnership” element add 
on top of standard cooperation? 
Much formal analysis of PPP usually resorts to contract theory. For example, one 
significant strand of literature investigates whether some or all tasks within one, typically 
infrastructure, project should be delegated to a single private partner (Bennett and Iossa, 2006; 
Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Maskin and Tirole, 2008; Chen and Chiu, 2010). This “bundling” 
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of consecutive tasks creates incentives for the private partner to perform well during the earlier 
stages of the project as this influences the outcomes at later stages, affecting the same private 
partner. At the same time, this approach “unbundles” contributions of the public partner from the 
project, and ignores benefits potentially arising through close collaboration. Suggesting an 
alternative approach, this paper considers PPP and the relevant types of contracts from the 
perspective of collaborative projects under asymmetric information (e.g. Roels et al., 2010; Kim 
and Netessine, 2013). Parties do not observe each other’s contributions; contracts serve to ensure 
appropriate incentives to contribute to the project, however contributions may need to be 
verified, which is costly. These verification and project management costs in standard contracts 
often impede the implementation of some projects. Are partnerships any different? 
Although the interpretation of the term "partnership" varies in the literature (and 
across disciplines), most authors agree that a partnership involves "the closest possible 
cooperation" (this definition of a "partnership principle" is extensively used in the EU integration 
policy documents, see e.g. Allen et al., 2005, p.218; Dahl et al., 2014), agreement on objectives 
(Brinkerhoff, 2002) and different degrees of formality, "ranging from informal, oral 
understandings to formal agreements" (Erhard and Brigham, 2006, p.4). Bajwa et al. (2017) 
emphasize interdependencies that arise in a PPP and the role they play for the successful delivery 
of the project. The partnership element in a project may ensure facilitation of co-production 
through improved communication and knowledge spillovers, as well as potentially bringing other 
benefits to the private partner, such as reputational gain. For example, Roberts and Siemiatycki 
(2015) advance the argument that a partnership delivers deeper cooperation and thus improved 
performance. This outcome may serve to improve the feasibility of projects, especially of those 
that cannot be implemented under standard contract terms. From within this framework one 
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derives optimal types of contracts and conditions to form a successful PPP.  
To validate the above proposed view of PPP as collaborative projects with a 
partnership element, and to test whether this theoretical framework explains the actual choice of 
contractual arrangements, this paper further investigates four PPP cases, focusing on the 
combination of public and private resources, information frictions, and types of contracts chosen 
to enable the partnership in each of the cases. The analysis also highlights the real-life provisions 
that distinguish the partnerships from other types of cooperation. Given that data on contract 
types and exact inputs of public and private partners in a PPP are not always disclosed, 
quantitative analysis is not really feasible, while a case study approach has the benefit of 
combining and analysing data from various available sources. Departing from the traditional 
infrastructure and building examples of PPP, this paper presents cases in waste management and 
traffic control. The cases selected, are from either an economy with a rather well-developed PPP 
sector and extensive experiences of collaboration between the public and the private sectors (the 
United Kingdom, UK) or an economy where this sector and relevant experiences are still very 
much emerging (the Russian Federation, RF). The first PFIs were introduced in the UK in 1992, 
with 641 contracts having been signed by 2009 (Hellowell, 2010), while in Russia PPPs started 
in 2005, when the Law on Concessions was adopted, with only 53 projects reported by 2012 
(Yarmalchuk, 2012). However, the Russian PPP sector continues to undergo rapid development: 
68 regional Laws on PPP were introduced by the end of 2015, allowing for a variety of 
partnerships and selection procedures. While 1285 projects have been listed in the register of the 
RF unified information system of public-private partnerships by the time of writing of this 
paper.3 A recent PPP development ranking of Russian regions4 estimates that 73% of PPPs in 
Russia run as a concession project, 17.5% adopt alternative forms allowed by regional PPP laws, 
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and the remainder are mainly through the lease of public assets. Russian PPPs are predominantly 
in the utilities sector (33.1%), social services (28%), energy (27.8%) and transportation (10.9%). 
For more details on the Russian PPP sector see, for example, Mouraviev et al. (2012) and 
Yarmalchuk (2012).  
The main theoretical conclusion of this paper is that PPPs are only justified for 
projects where the verification costs of the actual contribution of each party is high, and which 
have high sensitivity to those inputs as any deviation from the plan may significantly impact the 
outcome. If the verification of inputs is too expensive, a concession approach becomes the 
optimal PPP arrangement. Otherwise, a PPP should either pay the private partner stage by stage 
for inputs provided, or make a bulk payment once the project is completed and approved. 
Despite different institutional environments in the UK and RF, similar arrangements are in use in 
both countries, and the proposed theoretical framework successfully explains their application, as 
evidenced by the cases considered in this paper. These cases, chosen to be representative, expose 
the main components of the model, i.e. the contributions of the parties, the difficulty of 
establishing their actual inputs or the impossibility to credibly observe them (especially if these 
are intangible, like knowledge and expertise, or dispersed in space and time, like materials used 
to construct a road segment in remote and hard-to-reach areas), the sensitivity of the outcome to 
those inputs, and, ultimately, the type of the contract used to run the PPP. The latter is then 
compared with what would be optimal from the perspective of the theoretical model developed 
here.  
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2. Theoretical framework  
2.1. Collaboration and partnership principle  
Collaboration involves the consolidation of resources of the public and private party and the 
coordination of their actions when working on a project. Consolidation is justified when parties 
have comparative advantages in the provision of various resources, where each party should 
supply the resource that it can provide at a lower cost. Contributions to PPPs do not need to be 
limited to labour, capital and materials; additionally, the private party provides valuable 
managerial skills ensuring efficiency (a review of literature on advantages of private businesses 
as compared to public ones is in Megginson and Netter, 2001; in a later work, Bartel and 
Harrison, 2005, explicitly show that in comparable conditions performance of public sector 
enterprises is below that of their private-sector peers.) The most common resources supplied by 
the public partner include land, access to funding, and human capital that brings in specialized 
knowledge and expertise (Besley and Ghatak, 2001) as well as administrative experience and 
skills (Mahalingam et al., 2011), particularly in the area of reducing compliance and red-tape 
costs (Vinogradov et al., 2014).  
On top of the consolidation of resources, a PPP is based on a partnership principle 
where partners mutually agree on their objectives and rationally divide resource provision based 
on their respective comparative strengths (Brinkerhoff, 2002). Hodge and Greve (2007) note that 
the mutuality, i.e. interdependence and equality in decision-making as well as equal benefits to 
parties, constitute an important aspect of partnerships. Such a mutual agreement on objectives 
would also involve optimal sharing of risks, often seen as a crucial element of a PPP (e.g. van 
Ham and Koppenjan, 2001; Koppenjan and Enserink, 2009). To date, however, the partnership 
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element of PPP is neither clearly defined nor exhaustively discussed in the PPP literature, 
although some definitions of PPP explicitly mention true partnership as a criterion (e.g. 
European Commission, 2003). In corporate finance a partnership is known as an association "to 
conduct a noncorporate business", as in Erhardt and Brigham (2006, p.4). They elaborate on this 
definition further to stress that "partnerships may operate under different degrees of formality, 
ranging from informal, oral understandings to formal agreements filed with the secretary of the 
state in which the partnership was formed. The major advantage of a partnership is its low cost 
and ease of formation. The disadvantages are... (1) unlimited liability, (2) limited life of the 
organization, (3) difficulty transferring ownership, and (4) difficulty raising large amounts of 
capital.... under partnership law, each partner is liable for the business's debts". This is in line 
with the "partnership principle" advanced here, as unlimited liability of both partners creates 
incentives to care about the ability of the other partner to meet obligations. Yet when the "other 
partner" is the state, "unlimited liability" does not seem to work the same way. Therefore the 
model in the current paper explicitly requires that both partners are concerned about the overall 
success of the project.  
 
2.2. Projects and contracts 
This section is based on results formally derived in the working paper version of this article, see 
Vinogradov and Shadrina (2016); similar results for collaborative services are in Roels et al. 
(2010). A more detailed non-technical exposition of the framework with a focus on the 
institutional setting is in Vinogradov et al. (2014).  
A consolidated project is characterized by the inputs (contributions) of the two 
parties and by the sensitivity5 of the project to the parties’ inputs. As an illustration, using lower 
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quality building materials would require more frequent repair, and result in a higher maintenance 
cost of for example a road or other infrastructure objects, thus lowering their social value; these 
projects may be referred to as sensitive to the private party input. In addition, they are also 
sensitive to the input of the public party, which usually contributes at the planning and design 
stage. The sensitivity to the public input in this type of case can be higher than the sensitivity to 
the private one if, for instance, a road is planned without a proper account of social needs (wrong 
place or wrong capacity). Real-life examples of project sensitivity in waste management and 
traffic control can be found in Section 3.  
Collaboration is advantageous as it brings cost-efficiency, yet it may also be costly 
due to asymmetric information if the parties do not freely observe each other’s inputs. To give an 
example, a commissioning authority may be unaware of the exact number of workers employed 
or of the amount of materials used to construct a bridge, yet can obtain this information at some 
cost, for instance, through monitoring. Even if individual inputs are observed by the two parties, 
it is important that they are also verifiable when it comes to dispute resolutions. A project may 
fail due to the insufficient involvement of the public authority, yet either the private contractor 
will have to prove this in a court of law, or the public party will have to provide the evidence of 
appropriate involvement, requiring information verification costs in both cases. A similar 
situation occurs if the insufficient contribution is on the private side. 
If a party provides less resource than contractually agreed, it is subject to penalties. 
Penalties can be monetary or non-pecuniary, associated with the loss of reputation and foregone 
future profit opportunities. For the private partner the penalty may include the value of their 
physical assets (bankruptcy value). The harshest penalty that can be imposed on a public partner 
is the exhaustion of their reserves and the dismissal of the relevant public managers. An example 
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of a monetary penalty paid by a public partner is £30m paid by the Norfolk County Council to 
the Cory Wheelabrator Consortium for abandoning the Willows incinerator project at King's 
Lynn in the UK.6 In terms of the framework adopted in this paper, the public party delivered less 
resource than agreed, which caused the failure of the project. The specific resource in question 
here is the approval of the project and securing the state funding for it (the main reason for 
abandoning the project were 92% local citizens voting against the project and the subsequent 
withdrawal of the £169m government grant). The penalty imposed on the council entails £19m 
from current reserves and £11m from future savings, implying a longer lasting burden for other 
local projects and reputational damage. 
A contract between a public and private party specifies their respective inputs, the 
remuneration due the private partner, the liabilities of the parties (in particular, penalties), and, in 
the framework used here, the type of reporting on costs and contributions (input verification). 
Even if the mode of information verification is not clearly specified in the contract, one can 
associate it with parties’ beliefs in regard to which of them will actually be monitored or should 
credibly report on inputs provided. In some institutional settings it is the private party that is 
more likely to have to provide evidence of meeting the terms of the contract, therefore if the 
contract is silent on this issue, it implicitly assumes the verification of the private party’s input. 
Three types of contract are conceivable: those where only public input or private input is verified 
respectively, or where no input verification is conducted. The verification of both parties’ inputs 
is unnecessary because knowing the outcome of the project and the credibly verified input of one 
party should suffice to establish whether the other party underprovides.7  
The public partner designs the contract with an objective to maximise the project’s 
social value, minus the costs of its provision and the related verification costs. Verification is 
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only needed for the actual input and not for the cost. The private party’s remuneration for their 
input is established through a price revelation mechanism, such as a bidding/auction phase or a 
tendering procedure. This ensures not only that the most cost-efficient private partner is chosen 
but also that this partner reveals the lowest payoff they would accept for the provision of these 
resources. A contract with the verification of the private party’s input will specify that the private 
partner is only paid once inputs are confirmed. This approach is referred to as an 
input-contingent contract (IC-contract); it encompasses agreements where the private party is 
paid either on an hourly basis or for a specified contribution to the overall project, yet not 
contingent on the success of the project as a whole.  
If the contract stipulates it is the contribution of the public partner that is to be 
verified, the private partner is paid (as determined by the bidding phase) only if the project is 
successfully completed. This is because the exact contribution of the private partner cannot be 
credibly established; yet the success of the project (achieving the target value) implies agreed 
resources were delivered in full, and hence payment is due. If the project fails, and it is 
established that the public partner delivered in line with the agreement, this implies that the 
private partner failed to meet the terms of the contract, and penalties are imposed. Alternatively, 
if the public party failed to deliver, it is accordingly penalised in favour of the private party. This 
type of contract is referred to as output-contingent (OC-contract). 
An alternative to the two types of contracts above that verify contributions of the 
parties, is a contract that creates incentives for the private partner to properly contribute to the 
project without actually verifying their inputs. This can be achieved by making the remuneration 
dependent on the value that the project generates. Theoretically, contracts of this sort 
(performance-based, PB-contracts) are justified in microeconomics (e.g. Bhattacharya and 
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Lafontaine, 1995; Kim and Wang, 1998) for the cases where, as in the context of this study, each 
party has an incentive to minimise their inputs and let their counterpart bear the costs. 
Practically, this type of concession approach is a good example often used in PPP: the private 
party operates an infrastructure object and derives profit from payments by the end users or by 
the government, proportional to the actual usage of that object. In this case, the higher the social 
value of the object, the more intensively it is used, the higher is the payoff to the private party.  
A project is feasible if both parties agree to implement it by entering one of the above 
contractual agreements. The optimal contract is chosen by comparing the total surplus generated 
by the project under different contractual provisions. In the input- and output-contingent 
contracts input verification raises the effective cost of resources. It is therefore necessary to 
compare the cost with and without verification. An important parameter for this comparison is 
the verification cost relative to the pure provision cost, i.e. by how much more expensive (%) in 
total would be a particular resource if one has to monitor its provision. This is what this study 
understands as a verification cost throughout the analysis. For example, a complex bridge incurs 
higher costs of resources (per unit) than a road because a bridge would involve unique solutions, 
while constructing a road involves a repetition of more standard techniques at each segment of 
the road. At the same time, it is easier to verify the quality of the bridge and the resources 
actually used by parties, as it is one localised object, while it is more expensive to monitor the 
actual provision of resources for each mile of a road. For these reasons, the verification cost 
(relative to the provision cost) is expected to be lower for the bridge and higher for the road. 
Even if resources of both parties have identical provision and verification costs, different 
contracts imply different effective cost. In the OC-contract it is the public input that is verified 
and therefore becomes more costly than the private input. In the IC-contract (private input 
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verified) the private input will be more expensive when verification costs are taken into account. 
The sensitivity of the project to inputs determines then the type of the optimal contract: the 
OC-contract (public input verified) is preferred to the IC-contract (private input verified) if the 
project is less sensitive to the public input than to the private input, and vice versa. This is 
because choosing a contract that incurs verification cost for the input of the public party 
(OC-contract) reduces the optimal amount of this input (due to its higher overall cost compared 
to the contract with no verification of this input), which does affect the final value of the project, 
yet this impact is smaller if the project has lower sensitivity to this resource. In Figure 1, 
OC-contracts are shown optimal for projects with low sensitivity to public input and high 
sensitivity to private input (vice versa for IC-contracts). 
Unlike IC and OC contracts, verification costs are not present in the PB-contract. 
There is a trade-off between paying for information verification but achieving maximum value 
out of the project, and saving on the verification cost but reducing the project’s value (incentives 
without verification are weaker, hence the contribution of the parties within a PB-contract is 
lower than in the first-best case). If verification costs are high, a PB-contract would be preferable 
to both IC and OC. However this would only hold true if the sensitivity of the project to the 
inputs is rather low, otherwise even a small reduction in the input due to weaker incentives 
would lead to a severe loss of the value for the project. For this reason, PB-contracts cannot 
outperform IC and OC contracts at higher values of sensitivities. In Figure 1, therefore, 
PB-contracts are shown optimal only for projects with rather low sensitivity to inputs. 
Not all projects are feasible even if contracts are optimally designed. One reason for 
this are verification costs. Projects with high sensitivity to both inputs and with relatively high 
verification costs are likely to be impractical because they become too costly with IC- and 
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OC-contracts, and generate a too low value with a PB-contract. Additionally projects may not be 
feasible due to the remuneration of the private partner. The latter can be broken down into the 
compensation for resources provided, which can be measured per unit of resources, and a 
lump-sum amount, which does not depend on the actual contribution. This lump-sum amount 
may be needed to cover the sunk costs of starting the project, costs unrelated to the inputs, as 
well as a premium for working with the government. The lump-sum part of the remuneration 
represents a participation threshold for the private partner: even if the required input is small, a 
private partner would not be interested in taking part in the project if the payoff is below their 
acceptable threshold. The value of the project may be insufficient to justify high payoffs to the 
private partner, thus making the project infeasible for the public partner. Note that these projects 
despite not being financially viable may still be socially desirable. 
Finally, the partnership principle either brings extra benefits to the private partner, 
for which reason it can lower the participation threshold, or improves productivity of resources 
due to a deeper cooperation and thus saves on the production cost. Both improve the feasibility 
of projects. A reduction in the information and production cost come through the close 
cooperation and aligned objectives. Reputational gains, implicit guarantees and start-up 
assistance provided by the government may also contribute to a reduction in the participation 
threshold. PPP units  designed to promote and develop partnerships with the private sector and 
aimed at assisting the projects are an example of institutional arrangements that reduce the 
participation threshold (OECD, 2010, offers a review of PPP units and their functions in OECD 
countries.) 
Reduced participation threshold and lower information and production costs enable 
the implementation of projects that would be infeasible under standard contract conditions. This 
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aspect of PPP is demonstrated in Figure 1, which summarizes the core of the theoretical 
framework used here. Infeasible projects are now those that cannot be implemented even through 
PPP, while the area of PPP projects corresponds to those that would be infeasible under standard 
contractual conditions, without the partnership element, yet may be implemented through a PPP. 
This justifies PPPs as arrangements that outperform other forms of public good provision. 
IC-contracts are optimal for projects with higher sensitivity to the public input, OC-contracts  
for projects with higher sensitivity to private input, and PB-contracts outperform the two for 
projects with low sensitivity to both inputs. Because a PPP employs the same three types of 
contracts, they are shown in brackets. In Figure 1(a), verification costs and the participation 
threshold are small, for which reason the benefits from a PPP are rather small: establishing a PPP 
would enable implementation of a small number of specific projects that were not otherwise 
feasible. When, however, information costs and participation threshold are high, establishing a 
PPP can be highly beneficial for a large number of otherwise infeasible projects, as in Figure 1 
(b).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
2.3. Implications for optimal PPP arrangements 
The choice of the optimal contract for a PPP depends simultaneously on the project parameters 
(such as its sensitivity to inputs, and costs of verification of those inputs) and on exogenous 
factors embedded in the participation threshold of the private partner. In particular, the 
participation threshold depends on risks for the project triggered by actors or circumstances 
related or not to either of the parties (for example, changes in preferences of the public that might 
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affect the value of the project). Participation thresholds cannot be observed directly, yet one 
should be able to observe benefits arising from the partnership element affecting thresholds in 
real-life cases.  
Implication 1: A PPP is optimal only if the input verification costs and the 
participation threshold are relatively high; a PPP has a clearly demonstrable partnership element 
benefiting both parties beyond cooperation achievable in standard contracts.  
The infeasibility argument underlines that when the sensitivity of the project to 
inputs is small, parties can reduce the employment of resources that are too costly to verify, 
without a significant impact on the project value. For this reason, projects with relatively high 
sensitivity to both inputs can become infeasible, this is where a PPP can help. 
Implication 2: A PPP is optimal only for projects with relatively high sensitivity to 
inputs of either or both parties. 
As demonstrated in Figure 1, if verification costs for both inputs are equally small, a 
PB contract is unlikely to be optimal for a PPP because a better arrangement can be achieved 
through an IC or OC contract. 
Implication 3: A PPP through a PB-contract (concession) is optimal only if input 
verification costs are high.  
The choice between the IC and OC contracts depends on the relative verification 
costs for the inputs. Higher verification cost for the input of private partner makes an IC-contract 
(with a stage-by-stage verification of the private input) less cost-efficient, and therefore the 
optimal contract for the project is likely to be output-contingent. Similarly, higher verification 
costs for the input of the public partner makes the OC-contract less cost-efficient and more likely 
that the project should run under an IC-contract, as shown in Figure 2. For this reason, if a PPP is 
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being formed, in most cases it should resort to an OC-type of arrangement if private input is 
more costly to verify, except for very high sensitivities to private input (Figure 3a), or to an 
IC-arrangement if it is the public input that is more costly to verify, except for very high 
sensitivities to the public input (Figure 3b). If both are too costly, a concession (PB-contract) is 
optimal, as above. 
Implication 4: A PPP through an IC-contract is more likely for projects with more 
expensive verification of public input; a PPP through an OC-contract is more likely for projects 
with more expensive verification of private input.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
 
3. Cases 
The above three types of collaborative contracts between the public and the private partners are 
quite common in practice. This framework explains examples of government buildings in the 
Netherlands (IC-type PPP contract) and roads construction in Finland (concession, PB-type 
contract) from the Introduction. Note that due to the economies of scale, in large projects costs 
per unit are typically lower than in smaller projects. A building exemplifies a rather unique 
project of a smaller size than, for example, a highway. In a building project, the input of the 
private partner can be relatively easily verified: the construction site is accessible, usually in an 
urban location, for which reason regular monitoring is not problematic. Architecturally, large 
buildings, especially in a central location, are rather unique, which implies relatively high 
production costs per unit of input. Therefore verification costs relative to the provision costs tend 
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to be low, and Implication 3 rules PB-contracts out. Implication 4 suggests that an IC-contract is 
optimal for these types of building projects, as public input is less specific, and the sensitivity of 
the outcome to it is rather low. In contrast, large-scale projects like motorways offer 
opportunities for a reduction in costs per unit through the economy of scale argument, and in 
particular through a rather routinized repetition of standard actions at each segment of the road. 
However the length of the project site makes private partner's inputs less observable, suggesting 
higher input verification costs. As predicted by Implication 3, concession (PB Contract) is more 
likely to be optimal in this case. The same logic applies to the cases below. 
 
3.1. Performance-based contracts in waste management 
All cases are presented as a brief summary, sketching out the main building blocks of the 
theoretical framework, such as the contributions and liabilities of the parties, assessment of the 
sensitivity of the project to these contributions, the theoretically optimal and the actual contracts. 
Special emphasis is placed on the partnership elements embedded in the relationship between the 
parties. The cases also provide information on whether the project is successful or not, where 
available. Each case is accompanied with a list of case-specific references to original sources of 
data (see footnotes to individual case subheadings). 
Case A: Energy From Waste project in Suffolk, UK8 
Description: 25-year, £1-billion private finance initiative (PFI) waste management contract 
between Suffolk County Council and SITA UK. Includes £185-million incinerator in Great 
Blakenham (Suffolk, UK), a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, with the capacity to burn up 
to 269,000 tonnes of residual waste a year and generate enough electricity for 30,000 homes. [1] 
Public party contribution: Provision of the Great Blakenham site (in the ownership of the 
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Suffolk Council) on a lease to the private partner (at a peppercorn rent) for the duration of the 
project, which will revert to Council ownership on expiry of the contract or earlier termination 
[3]. Minimum guaranteed tonnage of waste to be processed (170,000 tonnes a year). Government 
grant of about £200 million over 25 years, to contribute towards the running costs [2]. 
Private party contribution: finance, technology, building facilities, management. £180 million 
Incinerator funded by SITA UK; at the end of the contract, the facility will be owned by Suffolk 
County Council [2]. Private party outsourced activities to other subcontractors, for example, 
architecture and design of the building were outsourced to Grimshaw. 
Liabilities of the public party: payments for an insufficient waste delivery; penalty if project 
plans withdrawn. Credibility of penalties is evidenced by a similar project in nearby Norfolk, 
initiated under the same conditions (and subject to the same government regulation), that has 
been withdrawn by the public party and resulted in penalties paid to the private partner (see 
example in Section 2.2). Minutes from Suffolk council meetings evidence discussions of the 
logistic schemes to achieve targets on waste delivery. The risk, of not meeting the waste volume 
target, is confirmed by estimates that “UK’s residual waste treatment capacity will exceed supply 
in 2017/18” [1]. 
Liabilities of the private party: penalties for broken deadlines, failure to meet standards; 
business risks, except for the risk of insufficient waste delivery. 
Sensitivity to contributions: First phase of the project (plant construction) is more sensitive to 
the contribution of the private party. The second phase (waste processing) is equally sensitive to 
contributions of both parties, as energy generation depends on the waste collection, as well as on 
the technology implemented and the quality of materials used in the construction of the waste 
processing facility.  
 
 
18 
Optimal contract: PB-contract, because project sensitivities to both contributions are equally 
high. Information costs are high (e.g. verification of the technology employed requires 
specialized knowledge). If the first phase (plant construction) was unbundled from the second 
phase, a fixed-fee output-contingent contract would be optimal for the first phase as it is highly 
sensitive to the contribution of the private partner, and the information cost (verification of the 
quality of the plant) is high. Due to the high information costs at the first stage, bundling it with 
the second stage is optimal, as it removes at least one information verification stage, and 
introduces incentives for the operator to ensure the necessary quality of the facility. 
Actual contract: PB (concession). The private party derives profits from waste processing fees, 
depending on the amount of waste processed, as well as from energy generation. The public 
party shares profit from energy generation (if it exceeds target). 
Partnership element: close co-operation, as evidenced by the minutes of the Council’s Scrutiny 
committee [4]. Assistance from the public party evidenced by the record-breaking short project 
approval time. The Council and the Community Liaison Group established by the Private 
Partner, jointly held meetings with the local community to update on progress and address any 
issues arising. Although identification of the construction site is usually in the remit of the 
private partner [5], in this case the site was suggested by the Council from the beginning (and 
accepted by all four bidders at the procurement stage) [3]. The council site provision reduces risk 
of proposal being rejected on the basis of suboptimal choice of site (translates in the reduced 
participation threshold in the model). 
Evidence of success: The plant opened on time and on budget [1]. Architectural award for the 
building. Civil Engineering award for the overall project. [2] Successful operation scheme 
including accommodating extra waste delivered from Norfolk after closure of several sites there. 
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Average electricity generation 570 MWh per day (daily data available from 
http://www.suffolkefw.co.uk); this exceeds the predicted energy generation of 225 MWh per day 
(converted from a figure of 80 000 MWh a year, [6]).  
Other remarks: the ownership of the facilities is transferred to the public party after 25 years; 
associated risks (worn out facility, amortization costs, modernization needs) are on the public 
party. Budget forecasting does not go beyond 25 years, and does not consider these costs. 
 
Case B: Waste processing in Krasnokamsk, Perm Krai, Russia9 
Description: Solid household waste (SHW) processing at Bekryata site (Krasnokamsk, Perm 
Krai10, Russia). From 2008, the Bekryata landfill site is under the management of the private 
partner «Bumatika», selected through a competitive procurement procedure. The initial contract 
was for 10 years. The waste management scheme includes a waste sorting facility, launched in 
2008 (the only one in Perm Krai at that time) and fully operating today, with a capacity of 30 
tonnes of SHW, capable of separating SHW into 18 fractions. Estimated investment value – 
RUR 38,5m (approximately £1m in 2008). Total planned investment – RUR 100m. The size of 
the site –16,7ha. Apart from the sorting facility, the operator introduced modern technologies and 
equipment for waste compaction and ground densification, reducing water pollution and 
simplifying future re-cultivation [1, 2]. In November 2013, Bumatika launched the second 
sorting facility, making it available to local university researchers for experimental studies in 
waste processing. Altogether, the project includes collection, transportation, storage, sorting and 
processing of SHW [3, 4].  
Public party contribution: land (at a peppercorn rent), monopoly waste processing rights in the 
Krasnokamsk area (where the site is located), red-tape reduction, monitoring of the ecological 
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situation in the region. 
Private party contribution: finance, technology, facilities, maintenance, management. [5, 6] 
Liabilities of the public party: no evidence of formal liabilities (penalty sanctions) of the public 
party. Legal sanctions for improper usage of public (municipal) assets if property rights are not 
clearly defined. Evidenced by court proceedings investigating the property rights and procedural 
regularities of setting the rental price in this case [7].   
Liabilities of the private party: regulatory sanctions if standards not met, business risks; 
penalty if project is not delivered; the public party has the right to terminate the contract. 
Sensitivity to contributions: the project is sensitive both to the private and to the public 
contribution. The private contribution ensures the quality of facilities, including environmental 
aspects, and partly the waste collection (apart from Bumatika, there are other collectors in the 
region who deliver waste to the processing facilities of Bumatika). The public contribution 
affects the amount of waste collected and processed [5, 8]. Unresolved issues with property 
rights and lease agreement delayed the launch of the facilities [10].  
Optimal contract: PB-contract, because the sensitivity to both contributions is comparable and 
rather high. Information costs are relatively high (e.g. verification of timely waste collection).  
Actual contract: PB-type, similar to concession. The private party derives profits from the waste 
processing fees, paid by other waste collecting companies, who are paid by households for the 
collection of waste. Additional profit is derived from sales of recyclable elements of the waste. 
[11, 12]. 
Partnership element: Assistance from the local administration in promoting separation and 
collection of waste: subsidies to businesses that separate waste, popularisation of waste 
separation. The private partner confirms the local administration is interested in and contributes 
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to achieving the objective of improved waste management in the region [9].  
Evidence of success: The project is still running. A second plant was launched in 2013. RUR 
168m (£2.5m) reported revenue and RUR 2.4m (£34 000) net profit in 2013 [13].  
Other remarks: the lease agreement between Bumatika and the local authority expires in 2019. 
From 2014-15 there is a surge in the competition in the market for SHW processing in Perm 
Krai. This creates additional business risks. In 2015 Bumatika has been reportedly acquired by 
Eco-Systems (Moscow), a company that aims at a consolidation of smaller SHW processing 
enterprises in the Perm Krai [13].  
 
3.2. Fixed-fee contracts in traffic and road safety management11 
Case C. Intelligent Traffic Systems in Essex (UK) 
Description: As of 2008, Essex had 7500 km of roads and 785,000 registered cars, travelling 
over 11 million vehicle kilometres annually. Traffic levels were estimated to grow by 2% per 
year. The county’s objectives were to improve the reliability of journey times for car users 
(increase journey time reliability to 95%) and reduce average journey times (reduce journey 
times by 1% across the board) [5]. To achieve these objectives, a partnership contract SA2000 
between Siemens/Atkins and the Essex County Council (ECC) was signed in 2006 for the period 
until 2013 [1]. Although formally this contract was announced as commencing in 2006, the 
actual start of the partnership dates back to 2000, when an initial contract with a total value of 
£7m was signed until 2013. Interruption and refreshment of the contract in 2006 is due to the 
programme restructuring on the public side [2]. SA2000 manages the design, supply, installation, 
maintenance and operation of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) in Essex and is responsible for 
keeping traffic moving. [3]  
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Public party contribution: At the pre-tender stage: funding, specification of needs: “…the 
development of the new contracts [needs to be] properly resourced and evaluated prior to going 
to tender. It is proposed, therefore, to establish a dedicated multi disciplinary team of staff to 
deliver the new contracts … some external resource will be required to support internal staff and 
it is proposed to secure experts from the industry to both provide advice and guidance, and also a 
resource to meet workload demands. This can be met from existing budgets. The intention is that 
that the wider industry and our existing partners will also be engaged in this process.” [7]  
At the post-tender stage: the county operates Essex Traffic Control Centre, involving Essex 
Police, Highways Agency, Regional and National Traffic Control Centre as stakeholders. The 
Centre is the main focal point for the Intelligent Traffic system and its congestion management: 
(1) acts as the control room for monitoring the network and implementing intervention strategies 
in response to planned and unplanned incidents, and (2) provides travel information and advice 
to the public relating to journey planning. Example of intervention includes changing timings on 
signal controlled junctions when they “lock up” due to heavy volumes of traffic. [5] 
Private party contribution: Technology, installation, maintenance of equipment, data collection 
and processing.  
Liabilities of the public party: n/a.  
Liabilities of the private party: the contract can be terminated, as exemplified by the review of 
the original contract of 2000 in 2006 with a note that despite a good partnership with contractors, 
there was need for improved contract control and better financial management because “the 
added value expected from the “partnership” has not materialised to the extent expected” [7]. 
Sensitivity to contributions: High sensitivity to private input (equipment needs to function 
correctly). High sensitivity to specifications of needs by the public party at the pre-tendering 
 
 
23 
(wrong specifications result in underperformance) and post-tendering stages (the operation of the 
traffic control centre is crucial for smooth traffic).  
Optimal contract: fixed fee IC-type. The input of the private party (equipment installed and 
working) is verifiable at a relatively low cost. The input of the public party (Traffic control 
centre) to the overall objective of improving traffic and reducing accidents is less visible despite 
website with live data, radio broadcasting, as it also involves proper and quick response to 
congestions and accidents, which are more difficult to verify. 
Actual contract: IC-contract: “the payment mechanism is a combination of actual cost, tendered 
rates and time” [7].  
Partnership element: long-term relationship, involvement of the private party at the tender 
preparation stage (see the pre-tender public party contribution above), increased involvement of 
the public party at the post-tendering stage. “Siemens and Atkins work with the council to 
develop a strategic plan to develop such technologies”. Contract has not been terminated despite 
programme restructuring. New “retrofit” programme to replace traffic signals with Siemens LED 
technology started in 2010 as a sign of continuing relationship [4]. Additional stimulus for the 
public party (ECC) through the Local Area Agreement (LAA) with the Department for Transport 
in 2006 to deliver improved journey time reliability across the Essex road network. This 
agreement included an element of pump-priming and, on successful achievement of the targets, 
significant reward funding of nearly £3m [5]. Maintenance cost on SA2000 contract reduced 
through on-road advertising by an additional agreement with Siemens [6]. “To ensure a strong 
partnership” regular meetings between the parties take place [7]. 
Evidence of success: 100% success against Operational Performance Indicators (OPIs) and Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) in 2011/12, up 27% since 2010/11. The OPIs and KPIs measure 
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various factors, such as: delivery to time and budget; reducing congestion; and lowering the 
incidents of people being killed or seriously injured on the county’s roads [3]. 
Other remarks: The input of the public partner is unbundled from the private input; therefore 
the contract refers mainly to the contribution of the private partner. Generally, this creates risks 
of insufficient cooperation and low benefits from a partnership, which was the case at the first 
stage of the project, from 2000 to 2006. These risks were remedied by the developed relationship 
and improved incentives for the public partner. 
 
Case D. Traffic and road safety management in Tula Region (Russia) 12 
Description: the local authority in the city of Tula has joined with a private partner to develop, 
install, and service speed and red light cameras on roads. The objective of the project is to 
improve safety on roads by registering violations of the highway code. Through appropriate 
penalties on drivers, this should lead to less accidents and injuries. The project is for the period 
of 2014-2020, with a funding of RUR 475m (approximately £8m in 2014). The Regional 
Ministry for Transportation and Roads provides open access to all relevant documentation, from 
the call for proposals, tendering documentation to the protocols of the meetings to select the 
private partner. [1] 
Public party contribution: Identification of locations, putting in force legislative acts necessary 
to implement this project, coordination of the interaction of all parties involved, financing the 
Operator (a special entity appointed to collaborate with and monitor the private party) [1]. The 
police department is responsible for the identification of drivers who violate the Code, and 
imposing penalties on them.  
Private party contribution: Finance, design, construction works, supply and installation of the 
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equipment, servicing and maintenance [1]. 
Liabilities of the public party: “as specified by applicable laws” [1].  
Liabilities of the private party: Penalties: violation of the agreed overall deadline or 
termination of the agreement is fined per month of delay at a rate of 0.01% of the maximum 
amount of investment; delays with intermediate targets fined at RUR 30 000 (approximately 
£500) per day [1].  
Sensitivity to contributions: The project is sensitive to the quality of equipment supplied and its 
proper installation (private party contribution), which depends on the timely approval of 
connections to electricity lines, coordination with municipalities and other parties involved 
(public party contribution). The overall objectives (safety on roads) are even more sensitive to 
the public input as failing to properly identify and impose fines on drivers violating the Code 
would significantly reduce the effectiveness of the system for the safety on roads.  
Optimal contract: IC-contract. The input of the private party (cameras installed and working) is 
verifiable at a lower cost than the input of the public party (using cameras to penalize speeding 
and dangerous manoeuvring on roads), IC-contract is also optimal even for higher levels of 
sensitivity of the project to the public input. 
Actual contract: Fixed-fee input-contingent (IC). The public party uses the system on lease 
from the private partner, with an option to purchase the system from the private party at the end 
of the lease agreement. If the system has to be dismantled due to road 
construction/extension/maintenance works, all expenses of the private party are paid in full. 
Partnership element: close cooperation. A special entity (Operator) is created to ensure 
day-to-day communication and decision-making. The parties agree to form a Commission to 
coordinate activities. 
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Evidence of success: The system has operated since 2014 with 33 elements running and 55 
installed [2]. By 2015 all 90 elements were running [3]. In 2015, the Minister reported a 
reduction of the number of accidents by 12% compared with 2014, which includes 24 fewer 
people killed and 329 fewer people injured in traffic accidents [4]. 
Other remarks: Similarly to the previous case of Intelligent Traffic Systems in Essex (UK), the 
delivery of the system is unbundled from the public input (identification and prosecution of 
violations). The risks of insufficient cooperation are partly remedied by explicitly introducing an 
Operator for day-to-day decision-making and agreeing to form a Commission for regular 
meetings. At the same time, the lease agreement contains the buy-out arrangement as an option 
for the public partner, which might have a positive effect on incentives for both parties. On the 
one hand, it creates risks for the private partner and incentives to raise the lease payments in 
order to lower the buy-out price. On the other hand, the private party is incentivized to 
demonstrate high quality and usefulness of the system, to ensure the buy-out option is realised by 
the public party, which, in turn has incentives for closer cooperation and monitoring under higher 
lease payments. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper considers PPPs from the perspective of collaboration between the public and the 
private sector. This framework extends the traditional approach where optimal arrangements are 
designed to delegate provision of public services to the private sector. The four case studies 
confirm that such collaboration indeed takes place, both in a PPP sector with a long history and 
experience (UK), and in an emerging PPP sector (Russia). Moreover, in both sectors similar 
projects appear to be arranged through similar contracts, suggesting that the suggested 
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framework is robust to country-specific variations in institutional systems.  
The framework developed in this paper explains why some PPPs are formed through fixed-fee 
contracts, and others through concessions. The crucial elements for the rational choice of the 
contract are the project sensitivity to inputs and the costs of verification of the actual delivery of 
those inputs by either party. The cases in this paper offer a qualitative assessment of these 
parameters. To further test quantitatively the framework used in this paper, one would need to 
collect data on types of contracts actually used to form a PPP and to quantify the above key 
parameters. Unfortunately, none of the existing sources seems rich enough to provide this data. 
Specifically, the data on the actual contracts between the public and the private parties are only 
available sporadically. However, given the normative implications of this type of analysis, such a 
quantitative study would be a challenging but desirable direction of further research. 
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